

**Comments on Louise Sheiner  
“The Long-term Impact of Aging  
on the Federal Budget”**

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# Issues taken up

- Impact of population aging on the US federal budget and public debt
- Policies to be adopted to respond to aging and maintain fiscal & debt sustainability, and the analysis of the contribution of each policy to the debt/GDP ratio
- Timing of spending and tax adjustments and the desirable composition of such adjustments
- Policy implications of growing life-expectancy disparities by income & education

# What the paper does (1)

- To show that population aging will raise spending on Social Security (public pension) and Medicare (health insurance for the aged) without any policy action
  - ▣ This will raise the federal debt/GDP ratio without limit, making the debt dynamics unsustainable
- To examine the impact of aging on the real interest rate and productivity growth
  - ▣ Will likely reduce the real interest rate
  - ▣ Will have uncertain impact on productivity growth

# What the paper does (2)

- To show that productivity growth slowdown will raise the debt/GDP ratio through
  - ▣ A decline in tax revenue due to slower growth of income
  - ▣ An increase in spending on anti-poverty programs
- To identify policy responses and assess their impact
  - ▣ Raising the size of labor force (i.e., greater immigration and higher labor force participation [through delay of retirement, women's higher LFP, etc])
  - ▣ Cutting spending (on entitlement and discretionary)
  - ▣ Raising taxes

# What the paper does (3): Exploring optimal response

- To examine the impact of policy action under different scenarios in terms of timing of action
  - ▣ Act today (reduce deficits) to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio at a low level (40%)
  - ▣ Wait for 20 years to take action to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio at a higher level (105%)
  - ▣ Finding: Benefits of acting sooner than later are small because of the low interest rate assumed
- To assess several spending programs to be cuts
  - ▣ Better to protect investment spending (infrastructure, social spending such as education and transfers to low income HHs) relative to consumption spending
  - ▣ Important policy implications of life-expectancy gaps

# A very useful and informative paper

- Useful analysis for the US budget and with some implications for other countries
- Good insight from numerical simulations
- Sound and balanced conclusion:
  - ▣ There is no urgency to act now
  - ▣ But considering the risk of future increases in the interest rate, better to act sooner to contain the rise of the debt/GDP ratio
  - ▣ As changes to entitlements (Social Security and Medicare) take time to implement, better to start acting sooner with small adjustments to spending and taxes

# Several comments/questions


- Immediate policy action may not be needed in the US, perhaps because the US population aging problem is not so serious relative to other OECD countries
- The US has had a long period of budget deficits, but why is there no political voice to reduce the existing deficits?
  - Because the current deficits will not pose debt sustainability risks?
- Response policies
  - Raising productivity growth very important, but not considered in numerical simulations on LFP increases and benefits cuts
  - A more substantial delay of retirement such as 5 years may be considered
  - Concrete measures to raise women's LFP are not presented
- What does “optimal” policy response mean?
- What is the “sustainable” level of the debt/GDP ratio?
- Broader question: What are economic, social, and fiscal priorities for the US?

# US aging pressure limited

- Population aging does not seem so serious in the US in comparison to other OECD countries
  - ▣ Old-age dependency ratio in the US in 2015 was relatively low among OECD countries
  - ▣ Its dependency ratio in 2050 is even less than Japan's dependency ratio of 2015
- Countries that face much larger aging pressure: Japan, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the Republic of Korea



# Old-age dependency ratio in OECD countries, 2015 & 2050




Source: Constructed from United Nations, *World Populations Prospects, 2015 Revisions*

# Labor force participation rate

- LFP rate in the US is not particularly high and there is large room for the LFP rate to rise in the US
- Ways to increase LFP:
  - ▣ Extension of the retirement age
  - ▣ Increase of women's LFP

# Labor market participation rate (age 15-64) in OECD countries, 2016




Source: OECD, *Preventing Ageing Unequality*, 2017

# “Optimal” response and debt “sustainability”



- How is “optimality” defined?
  - ▢ Based on social planner’s optimization?
  - ▢ Maximum welfare of consumers when achieving debt sustainability?
  - ▢ Least cost policy to achieve debt sustainability?
- “Sustainable” debt level
  - ▢ Avoiding the explosion of the debt/GDP dynamics
  - ▢ Achieving a reasonable debt/GDP ratio that is consistent with the ability to pay interest
  - ▢ Which level of debt/GDP ratio is reasonable, 40%, 77%, 105%, or 200% (as in the case of Japan)?
  - ▢ Debt should be measured in “net” rather than “gross” debt
- Some simulations suggest inefficient policy changes

# General government financial liabilities, gross and net (% of GDP), 2016



Source: OECD, *Economic Outlook*, June 2017

# Fixing the debt/GDP ratio at 77% in 2047 and deficit reductions needed to achieve it



- Why should the government target the 77% level?
- What criteria should be used to choose among the “act now”, “act in 10 years” and “act in 20 years” policies?
- In the case of “act now” policy, why would the debt/GDP ratio decline first and then rise later? Some intuition is useful.

# Suggestions for more simulations


- Identify the relative importance of key factors that lower the debt/GDP dynamics
  - ▣ Labor productivity growth
  - ▣ Larger size of labor force (increase in the fertility rate, labor force participation rate)
  - ▣ Cut in old-age related spending
  - ▣ Increase in tax revenues
  - ▣ Decrease in the interest rate
- Simulations under different combinations of these factors (with different values, such as high, medium, and low) would be VERY useful to get the sense of relative importance of each

# Economic, social and fiscal priorities in the US

- One of the most important issues in the US:
  - Social division
  - Widening inequality
  - 99% vs. 1%
- Social sector protection spending in the US is relatively small among the OECD countries
- Addressing income inequality for today's young & working generations can have positive implications for the aging society
  - Inequality tends to persist over time
  - Investment in human capital (education, job training & re-training, health) very important
  - Investment to enhance labor productivity (including TFP growth) key to alleviate future aging pressures




# Income inequality among elderly (65+), measured by GINI coefficient, 2014 or latest




Source: OECD, *Preventing Ageing Unequality*, 2017

# Social sector protection spending (% of GDP), 2016




Source: OECD, website

# Employment rate of semi-elderly (55-64) by education levels, 2015 or latest



Source: OECD, *Preventing Ageing Unequality*, 2017

# Life-expectancy gaps between high- and low-educated people at age 25 & 65, 2011



Source: OECD, *Preventing Ageing Unequality*, 2017

# Conclusion

- Very useful paper
- Paper could have clarified the concepts of “optimal” policy responses and “sustainable” levels of debt/GDP ratio
- Not only expanding the size of labor force but also raising labor productivity are key to respond to population aging
- Focusing on the inequality issue of the current generation may help avoid large burdens in the aging society

# **Thank you**

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