

# **Comment on David Vines “Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone after the Crisis”**

**Masahiro Kawai, ADBI**

Macro Economy Research Conference

“Fiscal Policy in the Post-Crisis World”

Nomura Foundation for Global Studies

Tokyo, 16 November 2010

# Outline

- 1. Post-GFC Fiscal Policy Challenges**
- 2. David Vines, “Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone after the Crisis”**
- 3. Some Thoughts on Fiscal Policy Challenges**
- 4. Conclusion**

# **1. Post-GFC Fiscal Policy Challenges**

# **(1) The G20's concerted response to the GFC, but the US and Europe continue to suffer**

- Monetary and fiscal stimulus provided by major economies in the world, together with the avoidance of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, prevented the world economy from slipping into the repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
- The GFC has had ripple effects on the GIPS Eurozone economies and induced declines in the value of the euro
- Unemployment continues to be high in the US and Europe and the risk of a double-dip looming


## **(2) The global economy is decoupling, so are policy directions**

- Decoupling of growth and inflation prospects *between* the US and Europe *and* emerging economies (particularly Asian)
- Should the US and Europe unwind fiscal stimulus? Is the UK's recent decision to do so advisable?
- Asian emerging economies are exiting from monetary stimulus to contain inflation and asset price bubbles. Should they do so in fiscal policy?
- The US Fed's QE2 can cause dollar depreciation and have a beggar-thy-neighbor impact

### **(3) The global economy has accumulated huge public debt**

- Public debt consolidation is clearly one of the largest global economic agendas in the post-GFC era
- The GIPS fiscal experience poses a big challenge for the viability of the Eurozone. Should the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) remain relevant?
- How can highly indebted countries consolidate public debt while pursuing growth?
- In Asia, can the new regional surveillance unit, ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), conduct meaningful macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in the fiscal area?

# Public debt of Japan, Greece, Italy will be the largest among OECD members in 2011



**2. David Vines**  
**“Fiscal Policy in the  
Eurozone after the Crisis”**

# **(1) Global (and intra-Eurozone) adjustment**

## **Prof. Vines claims adjustment requires:**

- A change in the relative level of absorption
- A change in the relative prices of goods produced in surplus and deficit countries
- A satisfactory level of global (or Eurozone) growth

## **This makes sense, but he needs to explain more about why such adjustment is needed:**

- It benefits US, UK and others with CA deficits?
- Can CA surplus countries (Germany) benefit?
- East Asia needs rebalancing because it is the only way to sustain growth

## **(2) Macroeconomic adjustment within the Eurozone**

### **The Walters Critique:**

- Intra-Eurozone price convergence requires that the low-price-level countries (GIPS) experience higher inflation than the high-price-level countries (Germany, France)
- But such inflation divergence can create difficulties
- High inflation countries (GIPS) experience (1) real exchange rate appreciation and loss of international price competitiveness, and (2) low real interest rates and high private spending; thereby current account deficits and external borrowing
- Low inflation countries (like Germany) experience (1) real exchange rate depreciation and gains in international price competitiveness, and (2) high real interest rates and low private spending; thereby CA surpluses and external lending

# Resolving the Walters difficulties

**The solution should be to accelerate price convergence, while managing the transition**

- through fiscal policy adjustment, and/or
- through structural reforms (productivity increase in GIPS)

**Prof. Vines focuses on fiscal adjustment and suggests to replace the national-based SGP by a fiscal policy framework to require**

- Fiscal contraction in low-competitiveness (high-inflation), CA deficit countries (GIPS)
- Fiscal expansion in high competitiveness (low-inflation), CA surplus countries (Germany)

**But he advocates the SGP for the Eurozone as a whole**

# The first-best solution

**Prof. Vine's suggestion is a second-best solution. The first best solution would be:**

- Complete fiscal integration
- Complete labor mobility (full integration of the pension system)
- Complete integration of financial crisis prevention, management and resolution

**Other desirable structural policies in GIPS:**

- To enhance productivity
- More labor market flexibility

# **In the second-best world, the suggestion makes sense, but...**

## **What are the incentives for countries to adopt such policy rules?**

- Will high (low) inflation be always accompanied by a current account deficit (surplus)?
- What can Germany gain from fiscal expansion, apart being the hegemonic leader in the region?

## **How do we measure competitiveness?**

- Unit labor cost? At what level?

## **How about a current account cap?**

- Is 4% a reasonable cap?
- Intra-Eurozone lending and borrowing (in particular through banks) can be limited

# **(3) What needs to be done for Greece in 2010?**

## **Prof. Vines suggests:**

- A combination of demand adjustment, cuts in wages and prices (so that the international price competitiveness rises by 20-30%) and debt reduction (affecting German & French banks)

## **Basically a sound approach:**

- It is a good idea to revive the discussion of SDRM in the Eurozone and globally
- But conceptually speaking, a very large financing arrangement, with a very long maturity, could avoid debt restructuring (including debt reduction)

**It will be useful to compare Greece with Asia, Argentina (which eventually left the currency board system) and Latvia (which has kept its CBS)**

	<b>Asia</b>	<b>Argentina</b>	<b>Latvia</b>	<b>Greece</b>
<b>Demand adjustment</b>	Large	Large	Large	Large
<b>Nominal exchange rate adjustment</b>	Large	(Large)	No	No
<b>Wage and price cuts</b>	No	Some	Large	Large
<b>Financing</b>	Small	Adequate	Large	Large
<b>Debt reduction</b>	No	Some	No	?

## **(4) Effectiveness of economic and financial surveillance**

- What was the source of failure in macroeconomic surveillance in the Eurozone?
- If the European Commission was not effective, what should have been the alternative arrangement?
- What should be the role of the EFSM and the EFSF in macroeconomic surveillance?
- How about IMF Article 4 surveillance?
- What would be the lesson for Asia where economic and surveillance under AMRO will have to be strengthened?

# **3. Some Thoughts on Fiscal Policy Challenges**

# **(1) Fiscal policy lessons from the GFC**

- Secure sufficient fiscal space in order to cope with economic recessions; put your fiscal house in order in normal times
- Prepare a list of priority fiscal spending areas so that in a recession time, the government can deliver quality spending programs
- Establish a credible framework for conditional cash transfer programs, conditional on incomes, family compositions, etc
- Introduce and improve automatic stabilizer functions
- Put in place supporting structural policies (labor market, bank and corporate restructuring, etc)

## **(2) Size or composition**

**Prof. Vines seems to focus on the size of fiscal spending, but the composition matters**

- In the middle of a severe crisis, it is important to support aggregate demand through expansionary fiscal policy
- Tax reductions or transfer increases to households may be the first course of action
- But Japan's experience suggests that it is important to direct fiscal resources to promotion of R&D, science & technology, future industries (like green industry) and preparation for the aging society (Japan) so as to improve potential output and labor productivity

# Size & composition of fiscal packages and other supporting structural policies are essential

	Reduce output gap	Avoid permanent loss of potential output	Enhance productivity & potential output
<b>Size of fiscal stimulus</b>	⊙	○	○
<b>Composition of fiscal package</b>			
Infrastructure investment		⊙	⊙
R&D, science & tech	○	⊙	⊙
<b>Labor market policy</b>		⊙	○
<b>Bank and corporate restructuring</b>	○	⊙	⊙

### **(3) Timing of fiscal policy exit**

- Too early an exit could jeopardize economic recovery, and too late an exit could create a debt sustainability concern and a rise in long-term real interest rate
- The UK's decision to exit from fiscal stimulus may be premature
- Can the US continue fiscal stimulus?
- Japan's premature exit in 1997-98 from fiscal stimulus was one of the factors behind the economic stagnation in 1998-99, which made fiscal consolidation even more difficult

# 3. Conclusion

- Post-GFC fiscal challenges are significant
- Mistiming of fiscal policy exit can create problems
- Prof. Vines makes a sensible approach to the Walters difficulties, by suggesting the integration of competitiveness (or inflation) policy and fiscal policy in the Eurozone
- But the Eurozone should pursue fiscal integration as the first best solution.
- How fiscal and monetary authorities should tackle the current difficulties in the West (including Greece and QE2) is very important
- East Asia should pursue growth rebalancing on its own sake

# **Thank you**

## **For more information:**

**Dr. Masahiro Kawai**  
**Dean & CEO**  
**Asian Development Bank Institute**  
[mkawai@adbi.org](mailto:mkawai@adbi.org)  
**+81 3 3593 5527**  
[www.adbi.org](http://www.adbi.org)